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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH BANK & TRUST, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Respondent APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
vs. 
JAf1ES H. QUINN and 
JAMES H. QUINN, JR. , 
Supreme Court No. 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District, the Honrrable Dean E. Conder presiding, (Judgment was 
rendered after a jury trial on the 17th day of September, 1979,) and from a sub-
sequent denial by the Court of Defendants' Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding 
the Verdict, for a remittitur, and for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is a creditor precluded from recovering a deficiency judgment 
in a situation where the creditor fails to give notice to the debtor of the sale 
of collateral as required by Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-9-504(3). 
2. Was the sale of collateral by the Bank commercially reasonable. 
a. Whether the Court erred in failing to give Defendants re1 
quested instruction relating to the elements of a commercially reasonable sale. 
b. Whether failure to give notice makes the sale unreasonable 
as a matter of law. 
1 
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3. Whether it is lawful for the jury to fail to award damages aft~ 
the Court has held as a matter of law that the Defendants were not given ade-
quate notice as required by Section 70A-9-504(3) of the Utah Code. 
4. Whether as a matter of law, the Defendant James H. Quinn is en-
titled to a remittitur on the damages down to the amount of the original guar-
antee signed by him because of failure of consideration for the agreement signe( 
on December 23, 1977. 
5. Did the Court err in failing to grant the Defendant's Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the alternative, for a remittitu1 
and a new trial? 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Appellant James H. Quinn, Jr. (Jay Quinn) was the President of 
an automobile dealership business in Salt Lake City, Utah, known as Alpine-Renni 
port. The flooring and financing for the dealership was supplied by the Plain- 1 
tiff Utah Bank & Trust, a Utah corporation, who is the Plaintiff-Respondent in 
this action. Dr. James H. Quinn signed a continuing guarantee with the Plain- I 
tiff Bank which guarantee provided that he would assume responsibility for the 
debts of the corporation up to the amount of $180, 000. (See Defendants' Exhibit 
6D, Tr. page 98.) 
On or about the 23rd day of December, 1977, the Defendant dealer-
ship was out of trust and the two Defendants met with Mr. Cook and Mr. Atwood 
of the Plaintiff Bank to discuss the situation. At that meeting, the officers 
of the Bank, specifically Mr. Cook, presented a note for the Defendants to sign. 
The Defendants signed the note. (Tr. page 11.) The purpose of the meeting was 
to work out a solution to the financial pro bl ems of the business. The note for 
2 
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$198,270.00 was signed at that time to bring together all of the debts of Defen-
dant Jay Quinn, Jr., and of the business. The note included $8,500.00 of a per-
sonal note of Jay Quinn and the flooring debts of the business including an ad-
vance made to the business of $40,400.00. (Tr. pages 18-19). At the t:ime of 
the meeting, the Bank had repossessed the collateral which secured their notes 
for the business. The collateral was in the hands of the Bank at that time. 
(Tr.page 12). At the meeting, there were discussions regarding how the debts 
owed to the Bank would be paid. It was the general consensus of the parties 
at that meeting that the collateral which had been pledged on the notes would 
be sold and that any deficiency which existed would be paid by the Defendants. 
It was understood that the cars would be sold with the assistance of Jay Quinn, 
Jr. who had some specialized knowledge in the field of marketing exotic and 
specialty high performance cars. (Tr. 98-100, 118). The cars, which in fact 
had been repossessed by the Bank, were sold for the sum of $67,000. The sum 
of $67,000 was substantially below the amount which was listed as the value of 
the cars on the flooring agreement. (Tr. 166-67). The wholesale flooring cost 
of the cars was $102,816.66. (Tr. 167). All of the cars repossessed by the 
Bank were sold in the Salt Lake area after having been advertised only in the , 
Salt Lake area papers. (Tr. 49-50). Mr. Cook, the Bank officer who handled the 
transaction, admitted that he knew nothing about the sale of exotic or special-
ized cars. (Tr. 51). Mr. Cook further admitted that no notice of the sales 
was given to either of the Defendants. (Tr. 47). The Court, in fact, held as 
a matter of law and instructed the jury, that the notice required under Section 
70A-9-504(3) of the Utah Code had not been given to the Defendants. 
3 
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Three people testified at the trial who had knowledge of the propet 
methods to obtain the highest price and properly market an exotic or specialty 
car. They were the Plaintiff's witness, Mr. Aagaard, the Defendants' witnesses 
'i~I 
)~ 
Mr. Pellum, and the Defendant Jay Quinn, Jr. There was unanimous agreement amo 
r~ 
all three of the expert witnesses with regard to the proper and reasonable meth 
of selling an exotic or specialty car. It was stated, that 
:>:: 
to reach the prope 
market and to get the best, but not necessarily the highest, price for a 
car, someone attempting to sell an exotic or specialty car would have to go out' 
side of the State of Utah. (Tr. 80-81, 131.) 
The Court allowed Hr. Aagaard, Plaintiff's witness, to be qualified 
as an expert witness regarding the proper method of sale for exotic and special· 
ty cars. He had 6 years experience in the used car business and minimal expo- m: 
sure to the exotic car business market. I ::~; Aagaard had no training of any type 
from any person or any dealership in the proper method of selling and marketing ;:~ 
specialty or exotic cars. 
i f.1<, 
Over the Defendants' objection, Hr. Aagaard was al-!··~ 
lowed to testify that in his opinion, the Plaintiff had obtained a fair price ·''l 
for the vehicles. 
.~ .. 
However, on cross-examination, Mr. Aagaard admitted that he .;.(, 
was a one-man operation. (Tr. 75), that he had no training or experience in 
the exotic or specialty car market, and that he had taught himself the operatiOI ::, 
(Tr. 76); that in six years he had handled approximately five Ferraris which i~: 
would be less than one per year, and that the exotic and specialty cars of the 
type we are concerned with in this case, have a national market. (Tr. 78-81), 
Hr. Aagaard testified that in his attempts to sell the cars repossessed by the 
Bank, he had advertised only in the Salt Lake papers. (Tr. 78). He admitted 
that the specialty car market was on a national level, and that in his opinion, ~ 
4 
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the best place to advertise the sale of a specialty or exotic car is in a spec-
ialty publi~at ion such as Auto Week (Tr. 80-81). He also testified that there 
would be a better market than Utah for the cars in Phoenix, Los Angeles, and 
San Francisco, and that any large city would have a better market for these cars 
than Utah (Tr. 80-81). Yet Mr. Aagaard failed to advertise the cars in any of 
these other areas (Tr. 81). In fact, Mr. Aagaard testified as follows: 
"Q: As a matter of fact, almost any of the larger cities 
surrounding Utah would be a better place to sell an exotic 
foreign car than Salt Lake City, isn't that true? 
A: Yes. If that's where your location was. 
Q: But you didn't advertise in any of these cities, did 
you? 
A: No." (Tr. 81-82. 
Mr. Ray Pellum was called to testify by the Defendants. Mr. Pellum 
testified that he was the sales manager at Bavarian Italian Motors in Salt Lake 
City (Tr. 123)". Mr. Pellum testified that people who buy specialty cars don't 
go to a regular car dealer to buy them. (Tr. 124). Hr. Pellum indicated that 
he had been in the used car business for 18 years and that Bavarian Italian Motors 
does have some dealings in exotic or specialty cars. (Tr. 124). He indicated 
that he had been trained in these cars through on-the-job training at the dealer-
ship because "it's a different field than just the average and domes tic cars." 
(Tr. 124). Mr. Pellum testified that the reasonable steps which he felt a per-
son should follow to market an exotic car were as follows: 
1. Make calls out of state to dealers who specialize in exotic cars. 
2. To advertise in out of state papers such as the Los Angeles Times 
or other large city papers, and 
3. To advertise in the trade and specialty journals such as Auto 
Week,. (Tr. 12 5-12 6) • 
5 
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Mr. Pellum was asked the following question: 
"Q: If I wanted to sell a specialty car and obtain the 
best possible price, would you confine advertising of 
that car to the local Salt Lake newspapers? 
A: No. 
Q: Would you, in fact, advertise in the local Salt 
Lake papers? 
A: Well, you might advertise in Salt Lake papers, 
but you would try to advertise, like I said, the Los 
Angeles paper and maybe the Denver paper. You have 
got to get -- there are not that many people for that 
kind of car. So you have really got to put it out 
where the people are. 
Q: In your opinion, would it be a reasonable method 
of selling the car to confine your advertising to the 
Salt Lake papers? 
Mr. Forbes: Your Honor, I object to that. Reasonable 
I think, is an ultimate conclusion. 
Mr. Wells: Your Honor, he is an expert. 
The Court: Overruled. He can answer. 
Q by Mr. Wells: Do you feel that it would be a reason-
ble method of marketing an exotic car to advertise only 
in the Salt Lake papers? 
A: No • " (Tr. 12 7 -12 8) • 
On re-direct examination, Hr. Pellum further testified that a person would have•: 
to go out of state to really get a market for the type of exotic or foreign carf '.i: 
that we are dealing with in this situation. (Tr. 131 at 15-17). 
Mr. Jay Quinn, the co-Defendant, testified that the entire business ;r: 
of the dealership in which he was involved was the r.iarketin~, selling and buyinl 
of used high performance specialty, classical and exotic automobiles. (Tr. 132: 
He further testified that the market for these cars was on a national level, 
6 
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and that he went all over the country buying and selling these cars. (Tr. 132-
134). Mr. Quinn testified that most of his advertising of these vehicles was 
carried about in national publications, such as Road & Track magazine and 
Auto Week. (Tr. 134-135) • He testified that he was presently employed as the 
sales manager of a dealership in Arizona which sold a lot of foreign and exotic 
specialty cars, and that his present employer advertised heavily in the national 
publications such as Auto Week and Road & Track. (Tr. 135). Mr. Quinn further 
testified that he had banking experience, having worked for the Continental Bank 
in Salt Lake City, from 1968 through 1970, where he held positions of head tell-
er, vault teller and assistant branch manager. (Tr. 135-136). Having had exper-
ience as a banker, Mr. Quinn then explained what was meant by the floor plan 
arrangement and how it worked and Mr. Quinn testified that the price that a bank 
loans on a floor plan arrangement was generally a liquidation price. (Tr. 137). 
Mr. Quinn testified that the floor value of the vehicles repossessed by the Bank 
was $102,816.66, and that in his opinion, the actual value of those vehicles 
was $128,465.00. (Tr. 167). Mr. Quinn testified that the amount at which the 
vehicles were floored, (see Defendants' Exhibit llD), was the reasonable liqui-
dation value of those vehicles. (Tr. 166). Mr. Quinn testified further that 
if he had had actual notice of the sales, a higher price could have been obtained 
for all of the exotic and specialty cars. He testified that, in fact, the bank 
had refused to allow the Ferrari to go to Arizona where a higher price than the 
price realized by the Bank could have been obtained. (Tr. 216). 
The Bank, in fact, sold the repossessed automobiles for approximate-
ly $67,000, and applied the equity of the sale of Mr. Jay Quinn's home to the 
7 
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note, leaving the Bank with a balance owing as of September, 1979, of $148,387,I 
including interest. The amount owed to the Bank before the application of in-
terest was $132 ,228. 61. (Tr. 41). Therefore, having applied the equity of Mr. 
Quinn's home and the sales price of all of the vehicles sold by the Bank, the 
Bank had only reduced the amount of the loan some $66, 000, an amount which is 
less than one-half of what Mr. Quinn, Jr. felt was the reasonable value of the 
vehicles which were repossessed. 
After having sold the collateral and applied the proceeds to the 
note, the Bank then sued the Defendants for the deficiency. 
The Bank claims that the Defendants are indebted for a deficiency 
judgment in the amount of $148, 387. 61. The Defendants claim that since the Bank· 
failed to give notice and allow the Defendants to protect the purchase price 
of the collateral vehicles which were sold, that the Bank is not entitled to 
recover any deficiency or if a deficiency is allowed, that the deficiency should· 
be limited to the sum of $45,700.00, which amount would cover the difference 
between what the Defendants feel the vehicles could reasonably have been sold 
for, and the amount for which the Bank actually sold the vehicles. 
ARGUMENT 
THE FAILURE OF THE PLAINTIFF BANK TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE SALE OF 
COLLATERAL TO THE DEFENDANTS AS HEQUIRED BY UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, SECTION 70A-9-504(3) PRECLUDES THE PLAINTIFF 
BANK FROM HECOVERING ANY DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT FROM THE DEFENDANTS. 
In the present case, the Court found as a matter of law, that the 
Plaintiff Bank had not given the notice required of Utah Code Ann., Section 
70A-9-504(3), regarding the sale of collateral. This Honorable Court, in the 
case of F .M.A. Financial Corporation v. Pro Printers, 590 p. 2d 803, 806-807 
8 
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(Utah, 1979), held "in an action for a deficiency judgment such as this, the 
secured party has the burden of establishing that the disposition of the prop-
erty was done in a commercially reasonable manner, and that reasonable notice 
to the debtors was given." (E h · dd d) A d d mp asis a e secure party un er the F.M.A. 
case to be entitled to a deficiency judgment, has the burden of proving two ele-
ments: First, that reasonable notice of the sale of collateral was given to 
the debtors, and second, that the collateral was disposed of in a commercially 
reasonable manner. Conversely, the failure of the secured party to establish 
either of these elements would mean that the secured party has failed to sustain 
the burden of proof required and that they c~nnot be awarded a deficiency judg-
ment. See Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Burns, 562 P.2d 233 (Utah, 1977); 
First National Bank of Bellview v. Rose, 197 Neb. 392, 249 N.W.2d 723 (1977); 
First National Bank & Trust ComEany of Enid v. Holston, 559 P.2d 440 (Okla. , 
1977). As the Court observed in the F.M.A. case, supra, the purpose of the 
notice requirement is to protect the debtor by permitting him to bid at the sale 
or to arrange for interested parties to bid or to assure otherwise that the sale 
is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. This notice requirement further 
inures to the benefit of the secured party by the debtor's assistance in secur-
ing a higher sale price. The precise danger, identified by the Supreme Court 
in the F.M.A. case, when the secured party fails to give notice, is that the 
property may be sold for an amount unreasonably below its market value, burden-
ing the debtor with liability for a greater deficiency. That precise danger, 
which the notice requirement was designed to prevent, has occurred in this case. 
The t.mcontroverted testimony in this case is that the amount loaned by the Bank 
9 
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on the flooring arrangement is a wholesale price. That it is a price which is 
designed to protect the Bank and a price at which the vehicles could be easily 
liquidated. (Tr. 53, 62, 137 .) Mr. Cook, the Bank officer who conducted the sales 
testified that he had no knowledge about the method or business of selling exo-
tic foreign or specialty cars. (Tr. 47.) Mr. Jay Quinn testified that the amot111 
for which the vehicles were floored were the reasonable liquidation prices of 
the vehicles. (Tr. 166) and that the vehicles were worth a minimum of $102,816.6~ 
(Tr. 167.) Mr. Quinn further testified that in his opinion with some effort 
on behalf of the party trying to make the sale of the vehicles, they could have 
been sold for $128,465.00. (Tr. 167.) Where the Defendant has testified with-
out contradiction that in his opinion the vehicles could hav-e brought as much 
as $128, 465. 00, and where the Bank, which ha<l no experience in the marketing 
of this specialty type of automobile, sold the vehicles for approximately $67,00 
without giving not ice to the Defendants of the sales or the amount of the sales 
and where the uncontradicted testimony of all of the witnesses is such that the 
only way to reasonably market the vehicles is to go out of state and advertise 
in the national publications, it is clear that the Defendants were damaged by 
the failure to give notice. The only tenable conclusion in this case is that 
the failure of Plaintiff to give proper notice caused the property to be sold 
at a price substantially below what could have been obtained had the cars be~ 
marketed in a commercially reasonable manner and had the Defendants been allowed 
to come in and protect their interests by having proper notice. Plaintiff's 
failure to give notice to Defendants effectively prevented them from assuring 
that the sale be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. In the case 
10 
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of Delay First National Bank & Trust Company v. Jacobson, 19 u.c.c. Rep. 994, 
998-99 (Neb., 197 6}, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that "compliance with 
the Uniform Commercial Code for notification as to the disposition of collateral 
is a condition precedent to the secured creditor's right to recover a deficiency." 
Since the Utah Supreme Court in the F.M.A. case has relied in support of its 
decision on some Nebraska cases, it is interesting that the Nebraska Court has 
held that absent notice to the debtor of the sale, the creditor cannot recover 
a deficiency judgment. In the Delay case, id. the Court further stated: 
" . • we now hold that if a creditor wishes a 
deficiency judgment, he must comply with the law 
in each transaction. While this rule may seem 
harsh, we are persuaded by the fact that the 
burden is on the secured creditor to comply with 
the law. The act is framed in his interest. It 
is not onerous to require him to observe the 
provisions of the law. " Id. at 1004. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court stated further: 
"this is an action to recover a deficiency judg-
ment, aft er the sale or disposition of ,the 
property taken by Bank under its security 
instruments. It is controlled by the rule enun-
ciated in Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 Neb. 575, 
223 N.W.2d 56, (1974). We there said, 'compliance 
with the Uniform Commercial Code for notification 
as to the disposition of collateral is a condition 
precedent to a secured creditor's right to recover 
a deficiency.'" 19 U. C. C. Rep. at 998-99. 
The Nebraska Rule is clear. Unless the creditor gives notice of 
the sale to the debtor as required by 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
the creditor cannot recover a deficiency judgment. The Court stated that the 
reason for this rule is that 
11 
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"obviously it (the notice provision) is intended 
for the benefit and protection of the debtor. If 
he is given notice, he will have at least an oppor-
tunity to protect his interests by redemption, 
finding prospective purchasers for the property, 
or otherwise. Even if it might be determined he 
could not have protected his interest, the law 
requires he be given the opportunity." 
Id. at 999. The Nebraska Rule, "no notice-no deficiency," appears to be the 
1 
majority rule in the United States. 
It would also appear from the F.M.A. case, supra, that the Utah 
I !lJ! 
Supreme Court has adopted the majority rule wherein it is held that unless the [ 
)~ 
creditor gives notice to the debtor as required by the Uniform Commercial Code, 
the creditor cannot recover a deficiency. 
12 
1 Delay First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., supra; 
Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 S.2d 534, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 383 (Fla.,::~. 
1973); First National Bank & Trust Company of Enid v. Holston, supra; 
Wells Fargo Bank v. Carter, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 874 (oth Cir., 1975); One Twenty 
Credit Union v. Darcy, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 792 (Mass. App. Div., 1968); First 
National Bank of Bellview v. Rose, supra; Wheeless v. Eudora Bank, 256 Ark. S.Ct :::: 
644, 14 U.C.C. Rep. 1068 (1974); Foster v. Knutson, 527 P.2d 1108, 15 U.C.C. 
Rep. 1127 (Wash., 1974); Beneficial Finance Co. of Black hawk County v. Reed,. t'.t 
212 N.W.2d 454, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 974 (1973); Braswell v. American National Bank, 
117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); Babber v. Williams Ford Co., 239 Ark. t:: 
1054, 396 S.W.2d 302 (1965); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3rd 999, 
104 Ca. Rep. 315, (1972); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lloyd, 12 U.C.C. Rep. 15 il~ 
(D.D.C., 1973); Camden National Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329 (Haine, 1973); 
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation v. Atlas Shirt Co., 323 N.Y.2d 13 
(1971); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Ferris, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 899 (D. Mich., 1971); 
Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F.Supp. 696 (D. Penn., 1963); vacat 
on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3rd Cir., 1964); Aimonetto v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 
1017 (Wyo., 1973); Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F.Supp. 
659 (W.D. Okla., 1972); Prairie Vista, Inc. v. Cassella, 12 Ill. App. 3rd 34, 
29 7 N. E. 2d 385 (1973); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. 
App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966); Leasing Associates, Inc. v. Slaughter & Son,, 
Inc., 450 F.2d 174 (8th Cir., 1971); In Re Carter, 511 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir., 19]; 
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In the case of Chrsyler Credit Corp v. Burns, supra, the Court specifically 
held as follows: 
"Further, the District Court in its judgment dated May 17, 
1976, stated that no notice of the time, date, place and 
manner of sale was ever given to Burns by U and S Motor Company 
as is normally required under statutory procedures mentioned 
supra. (Referring to Utah Code Annotated, Section 70A-9-504(3)). 
The record in this matter, because of reasons advanced in comments 
previously made, demonstrates that the sale was not commer-
cially reasonable. Therefore, we hold that U and S Motor 
Company is entitled to no deficiency judgment, as the 
District Court adjudged; and that it is entitled to 
no attorney's fees as to which the District is reversed." 
562 P.2d at 234. 
Thus, it would appear, from the Chrysler Credit Corp. case, supra, that the 
Supreme Court has held that one of the elements of a commercially reasonable 
sale is notice of the sale to the debtor and that where the debtor has not re-
ceived notice as required by statute, as a matter of law, the sale is not com-
mercially reasonable and the creditor is not entitled to a deficiency. This 
holding seems to comply with what the Court has stated in F.M.A.,supra. No de-
ficiency judgment can be allowed where notice is not given or the sale is not 
commercially reasonable. Notice of the sale of collateral is one of the essen-
tial elements of a commercially reasonable sale, and absent proper notice to 
the Defendant of the sale, the creditor would not be entitled to a deficiency 
judgment. 
II 
WAS THE SALE OF COLLATERAL BY THE BANK COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE? 
A. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS 
P~QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 7 RELATING TO THE 
ELEMENTS OF A COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE SALE. 
The Defendants requested the Court to give the following instruction 
13 
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to the jury relating to the elements of a commercially reasonable sale under 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: 
You are instructed that in determining if the sale 
of the cars and boat was carried out in a commercially 
reasonable manner, all aspects of the sale are to be 
considered. In making a determination as to commercial 
reasonableness of the sale, you may consider whether normal 
commercial practices in disposing of the particular type 
of cars involved were followed; you may consider the amount 
and type of advertising done by the Bank; you may consider 
any failure to advertise the cars in specialty-car publi-
cations or trade journals; you may consider whether the 
notice advertised by the Bank was reasonably calculated 
to assure such publicity that the cars will bring the best 
possible price; you may consider the length of time between 
repossession and sale, and whether any deterioration of 
the cars and boat was allowed to occur; you may consider 
the number of persons contacted by the Bank regarding 
the sale; you may consider whether an adequate price was 
obtained; and you may consider whether the method 
of sale conforms to accepted dealer practices. 
If you find.after careful consideration of all as-
pects of the sale that the sale of the cars and 
boat were not carried out in a commercially reason-
able manner, then you are required to find that the 
Bank failed to conduct the sale in a commercially 
reasonable manner. 
The Court held in this case that notwithstanding the failure of the 
Bank to give proper notice as required by the Uniform Commercial Code, the jury 
could nonetheless award a deficiency judgment if they found that the sale was 
commercially reasonable. The case law regarding whether or not a sale is com-
mercially reasonable, sets out the criteria by which a commercially reasonable 
sale is to be conducted and all of the elements set forth in Defendants' re-
quested instruct ion no. 7 are elements which Courts have determined should be 
considered in making a determination as to whether or not the sale of colla-
teral was carried out in a commercially reasonable manner. The failure of the 
14 
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Court to instruct the jury with regards to the specific elements to be considered 
in making the determination as to commercial reasonableness, deprived Defendant 
of a fair trial and allowed the jury to speculate as to what the elements of 
a commercially reasonable sale are. There is evidence in the case which could 
have supported a finding by the jury that each of the specific elements set 
forth in Defendants' requested instruction no. 7 existed. There was adequate 
evidence upon which to find that the sale was not carried out in a commercially 
reasonable manner. The failure of the Court to properly instruct the jury with 
regard to the specific elements of a commercially reasonable sale denied to De-
fendant the right to have the jury properly determine whether the sale was com-
mercially reasonable in light of the evidence adduced in the case. 
Courts have uniformly held that in making a determination as to 
whether or not a sale was commercially reasonable, the jury may properly consid-
er the amount and type of advertising done by the creditor prtor to the sale 
of the collateral. See ~Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool 
Division of the Rucker Co., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 1288 (10th Cir., 1976); Central 
Budget Corp. v. Garrett, 17 U.C.C. Rep. 327 (N.Y., 1975); Harris v. Bower, 
295 A. 2d 870, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 428 (Md., 1972); and Stewart v. Taylor Chevrolet, 
Inc.,. 17 U.C.C. Rep. 627 (S. D. Ohio, 1975). 
In the present case, the evidence from the Bank was that the boat 
was advertised in the local papers only three times during a fourteen-month 
period, (Tr. 33). Mr. Cook further testified although he had no knowledge as 
to the method of sale for specialty or exotic cars, and the cars and boat were 
only advertised locally, no attempt was made to advertise any of the cars or 
15 
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boat for sale outside of the state of Utah. The only advertisement done of tht 
boat and cars was in the Salt Lake papers. ~r. 49-51, 33J 
The Courts have also recognized that the failure to advertise spec. 
ialty it ems in specialty publications or trade publications which specifically 
relate to that type of collateral, is sufficient to make the sale of collateral 
commercially unreasonable. See~ Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme 
Tool Division of the Rucker Co., supra; Harris v. Bowers, supra; Jones v. Bank 
of Nevada, 535 P. 2d 12 79 (1975). In the present case, all three of the expert 
witnesses testified that the only effective method of reaching what was conside1 
the reasonable market for exotic and specialty cars was to advertise out of staj 
and in the trade journals. (Tr. 77-80, 124-27, 188.) In fact, both Mr. Pellum 
and Mr. Aagaard testified that it was not reasonable to advertise the cars only/ 
in the Salt Lake market. (Tr. 128, 80-81.) I 
The Courts have also held that the notice of the sale must be reaso~ 
ably calculated to bring the best price. See ~ Harris V. Bower, supra, and I 
Jones v. Bank of Nevada, supra; Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Too1 j 
I 
Division of the Rucker Co., supra. In the present case, all of the witnesses 
testified that a better price could have been obtained out of the state of Utahi 
They also testified that to reach the market, one must advertise in the special• 
ty magazines and trade journals. However, none of this was done. Therefore, 
the jury could have properly found that the not ice of sale and method of sale 
were not reasonably calculated to bring the best price. 
In the case of Harris v. Bower, supra, the Court found that proper 
consideration should be given to the amount of time from the repossession to 
16 
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the sale, and whether or not any of the collateral was allowed to deteriorate 
prior to the sale. In this case, there is evidence that the boat was held for 
some 14 months during which time it developed a cracked block. The Bank made 
no effort to make any repairs to the boat before it was sold. The boat was sold 
in an as is condition for $3,000.00, which was less than half of the price that 
the boat should have brought and, therefore, the jury could properly have found 
that the sale of the boat was not commercially reasonable had they been properly 
instructed. 
The Court in Harris v. Bower, supra; Central Budget Corporation v. 
Garrett, supra, and Dynaelectron Corporation v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 
supra, determined that the number of people contacted regarding the sale was 
also an element that should be considered in determining whether the sale was 
reasonable. In the present case, the testimony is that at most, three dealers 
were contacted, that the bank allowed Mr. Aagaard to sell most of the vehicles 
and made no real effort to sell the vehicles other than through Mr. Aagaard. 
(Tr. 2 5-2 8 , 5 2 , 7 5-7 6 • ) 
In Liberty National Bank & Trust, supra, and Central Budget 
Corporation case, supra, the Court stated that the price obtained was one of 
the factors to be considered. In the present case, there is conflicting testi-
mony as to whether or not the price obtained was reasonable; however, there is 
adequate testimony from all of the experts that better prices could have been 
obtained outside the State of Utah. Therefore, the failure of the Bank to make 
attempts to advertise or sell the cars outside of the State of Utah could esta-
blish the fact in the jury's mind that an adequate price was not obtained. This 
17 
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is bolstered by the fact that the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Jay Qu:inn was 
that the amount for which the vehicles were floored by the Bank, to-wit $102,00I 
plus, was a liquidation price. Where the Bank sold the vehicles for some 60% 
of the accepted liquidation price, this could be sufficient evidence that the 
1 
price was not adequate. 
Another major problem relates to whether or not the sale as carrie~ 
out by the Bank conformed to accepted dealer practices. The Court in~ 
National Bank & Trust Co. of Enid v. Halston, supra, and the Liberty National 
Bank & Trust Co._ .case, supra, determined that one of the major aspects of a com· 
I 
I 
mercially reasonable sale was that the sale conform to accepted dealer practiceJ 
regarding the type of collateral being sold. The uncontroverted evidence as 
established by the experts who testified on the point, was that dealer practicej 
with regard to the sale of exotic and high performance cars was that the market! 
be investigated on a national level through checking with dealers in other stat~ 
as well as advertising the vehicles in national trade publications. (Tr. 79-81, 
124-128, 131.) In fact, the Plaintiff's own expert witness testified as follows:! 
"Q: As a matter of fact, almost any of the larger 
cities surrounding Utah would be a better place to 
sell an exotic foreign car than Salt Lake City, 
isn't that true? 
A: Yes, if that's where your location was." 
(Tr. 81-82 .) And the uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Ray Pellum, an expert wit-
ness called by the Defendants was that the reasonable steps taken by a person 
in the business of dealing in exotic and high performance cars was to call the 
dealers out of state, advertise out of state in specialty magazines, and trade 
journals, and to advertise in the large cities such as Los Angeles or PhoeniX. 
18 
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(Tr. 125-26.) In fact, Mr. Pellum stated that it would not be a reasonable: 
method of selling an exotic or specialty foreign car to advertise only in Salt 
Lake City but that a person must go out of state for such a market.(Tr. 128, 
131.) 
Each of the elements set forth in Plaintiff's requested instruction 
no. 7 could be considered by the jury as a basis for finding the sale of calla-
teral in this case to be commercially unreasonable. Therefore, the failure of 
the Court to give requested instruction no. 7 is reversible-error and entitles 
Defendants to a new trial on the issue of whether the sale was commercially 
reasonable. 
B. 
\-JHETHER FAILURE TO GIVE THE NOTICE REQUIRED BY SECTION 
70A-9-504 (3) OF THE UTAH CODE MAKES THE SALE OF COLLATERAL 
BY THE BANK UNREASONABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In the F .M.A. case, supra, this Court ruled that a secured party 
to be awarded a deficiency must sustain the burden of proof as to two elements: 
(1) that reasonable notice was given to the debtor as required under Section 
70A-9-504 and (2) that the disposition of collateral was done in a commercially 
reasonable manner. In effect, the Court is stating that two elements must exist. 
First, notice, and second, a commercially reasonable sale. In fact, this Court 
in the case of Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Burns, supra, held that one of 
the elements, in fact, one of the essential elements, of a commercially reason-
able sale was notice to the debtor and held that because there was no notice, 
the particular sale was not commercially reasonable and no deficiency judgment 
could enter. Other Courts have treated the issue of a commercially reasonable 
19 
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sale in the same manner and held that notice is one of the essential elements 
of a commercially reasonable sale and, therefore, without notice, the sale as 
a matter of law cannot be commercially reasonable. See ~ Beneficial Finance; 
I 
Company of Blackhawk Co. v. Reed, 212 N.W.2d 454, 13 U.C.C. Rep. 974 (Iowa, 1973: 
The First National Bank & Trust Co. of Enid v. Holston, supra; Foster v. Knutson 
15 U.C.C. Rep. 1127, 527 P.2d 1108 (Wash., 1974); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Bul1]!
1 
supra, Secured Transaction: commercial reasonability of secured parties sale i 
I 
I' 
of collateral after default under U.C.C. Section 9-504(3), 29 Okla. L.Rev. 486 
(1976). 
The reasoning behind the cases is that the purpose for requiring 
notice to the debtor is to allow the debtor to protect himself. In Foster v. 
Knutson, supra, the Washington Supreme Court sets out the test for determining 
whether a sale was commercially reasonable. The Court states that in order for 
the sale to be considered commercially reasonable, there must be: (1) notice 
given to the debtor and the public to allow a reasonable opportunity to parti· 
cipate, (2) notice given to those reasonably expected to have an interest in 
the collateral, (3) notice sufficiently replete in describing the collateral 
and the amount of the obligation and (4) notice published in a manner reasonably 
calculated to bring the best possible price. The Court then states that if 
these four tests are met, the fact that a better price could have been obtained 
I 
on some other occasion does not make the sale oo.reasonable. 15 U.C.C. Rep. 1135; ~: 
It is clear that the failure to notify the debtor is a major factor which can 
make a sale unreasonable. See Beneficial Finance Co. of Blackhawk Co. v. Reed, 
supra. 
20 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the present case, there was no notice to the Defendants and the 
uncontested evidence is that no attempt was made by the Bank to reach the market 
for exotic specialty cars and high performance cars and, therefore, obtain the 
best possible price. Had Jay Quinn, Jr., known the prices for which the cars 
were being sold, there is no question he would have bid in at the sales. He was 
denied that right, which is a substantial right, by the Bank's failure to notify 
him of the sales as required by statute. The Bank did not advertise where the 
real market for exotic cars existed (out of state) or in a manner designated 
to reach the exotic or high performance car market (Road & Track, Auto Week, 
etc.) To make the sale reasonable, such advertisement should have been made. 
Under the cases cited above, it.is clear that in the present case 
the ·sale was unreasonable as a matter of law because (1) the Bank gave no notice 
of the sale and therefore denied to Defendants the right to protect themselves 
from a sale substantially below the reasonable value of the collateral; (2) a 
higher price could likely have been obtained by advertising or attempting to 
sell the cars on a national level, (3) the sale of the cars was not carried 
out in the normal manner used by dealers in exotic and high performance cars. 
See the testimony of Mr. Pellum and Jay Quinn,CTr. 126-131, 132-135~ There was 
a better market out of state. Id. (4) to reach the exotic and high performance 
car market, ads should go in trade journals such as Road & Track and Auto Week. 
See testimony of experts, supra; (5) advertisement in local papers only would 
not reasonably reach the potential market. See testimony of experts, supra; 
(6) Hr. Cook was advised that the best market was out of state, but did not make 
any effort to reach such market(Tr. 47, 49-51, 60, 161, 216J Therefore, it 
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should be clear to the Court that the failure to notify the Defendants of the 
sale when coupled with the other it ems referred to above, make the sale of the 
collateral by the Bank commercially unreasonable and should preclude the Plain-
tiff Bank in this case from recovering a deficiency judgment on the loan secure 
by the collateral or in the alternative, entitle Defendants to a new trial. 
III 
WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR THE JURY TO FAIL TO AWARD 
DAMAGES AFTER THE COURT HAS HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT GIVEN ADEQUATE NOTICE 
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 70A-9-504(3) OF THE UTAH CODE. 
The Court held as a matter of law that in this case the Bank did 
not give the notice of sale required by the provisions of the Utah Code. The 
failure of the jury to award any damages at all for a wrong clearly committed 
is a clear violation of their duty. The uncontrovert ed testl.mony in the case 
was that the cars were worth substantially in excess of the price for which they 
were sold by the Bank. (Tr. 166-167.) The Bank offered absolutely no evidence 
to refute the claim of Mr. Jay Quinn that the automobiles in fact were worth 
at least $102,816.66, and possibly as much as $128,465.00. (Tr. 167.) The mere 
fact that the Bank sold the cars for substantially less than these figures is 
not in itself sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that Hr. Quinn 
may have been able to sell the cars for a greater amount had he had notice of 
the intended sales by the Bank. 
Those cases such as Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prod~ 
Inc., 535 P.2d 1007, 16 U.C.C. Rep. 1442 (N.M., 1975) which adopt the minority 
view that lack of notice does not preclude a deficiency judgment, all adopt the 
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view that while the lack of notice does not of itself preclude a deficiency 
judgment, it does place upon t.he creditor the substantial burden of disproving 
the presumption that the reasonable value of the collateral was the same as the 
amount owed on the note. See In Re: Bishop, 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir., 1973). 
In the Clark Leasing Corp. case, supra, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
in accepting what it confesses to be the minority view that failure to give 
notice does not preclude a deficiency, makes the following statement: 
"We agree with those courts that hold that a secured 
party's failure to comply with Section 9-504-(3) does 
not result in a forfeiture to a right of a deficiency. 
Under these decisions, where the value of the collateral 
is at issue, (as in the present case), there is a presump-
tion that the value of the repossessed collateral at resale 
is equal to the value of the outstanding debt. Where the 
sale is conducted in accordance with Section 9-504(3), 
the sum received at sale is evidence of the market value. 
But if the sale is not conducted according to the Code, 
the amount received is not evidence of the market value 
of the collateral. The secured party has the burden of 
proving the market value by other evidence." 16 U.C.C. Rep. at 
1448. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, we have only two positions with regard to what happens in the 
event that the creditor fails to give notice as required by the statute, the 
situation which exists in this case. The majority view as set forth in Para-
graphs I and II above, is that the creditor, if he does not give notice, cannot 
recover any deficiency. The minority position as set forth in the New Mexico 
case of Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands, supra, is that in a situation where 
the creditor fails to give notice of the sale to the debtor, there arises a pres-
umption that the amount of money owed on the note is the reasonable value of 
the security and the Bank then has to introduce evidence independent of the ac-
tual sale price to prove what in fact the market value is. In the present case, 
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the only evidence other than the actual sale price as to what the market value 
was, was the evidence introduced by Mr. Jay Quinn that in his opinion as an ex. 
pert, the reasonable market value of those vehicles repossessed by the Bank, 
was $128,465.00. (Tr. 167 .) Therefore, if this Court does not adopt the majoriti 
view that failure to give notice precludes a deficiency altogether, the failure 
of the jury to award damages amounting to the difference between the amount 
that the vehicles were actually sold for and the amount the vehicles were worth 
as evidenced by the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Jay Quinn, is clearly erron· 
eous. The failure of the jury to award any damages is contrary to the evidence 
and the case should be· reversed and remanded for a new trial based on that fact 
alone. 
IV 
WHETHER AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DEFENDANT JAMES H. 
QUINN IS ENTITLED TO A REMITTITUR ON THE DAMAGES 
AWARDED TO THE BANK. 
After the jury returned its verdict in this case, the Defendants 
made a mot ion to the Court to grant a remittitur to Dr. Quinn in the amount of 
$21,543.80. James H. Quinn, Sr. originally guaranteed the debts of James Quinn, 
Jr. and Alpine Rennsport in the amount of $180, 000. See Exhibit 6D, (Tr. 98.) 
Dr. Quinn has no quarrel with the fact that he made that guarantee and that he 
received consideration therefor. He guaranteed those debts prior to the time 
that the money was advanced by the Bank and agrees there was consideration for 
his guarantee of those particular debts to a maximum of $180,000.00. However, 
on December 23, 1977, when the Defendants were called in to the office of the 
Bank and requested to sign the note in the amount of $198,240.00, no additional 
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consideration was given to Dr. James Ho Quinn at that time for incurring the 
additional liability in the amount of $18,240.00. It is clear from the evidence 
that this note was a consolidation of debts owed by the Defendant James H. Quinn, 
Jr. and Alpine Rennsport. (Tr. 19~ No additional consideration was ever given 
for Dr. Quinn's guarantee of that note and his assumption of an addttional liab-
ility of $18,240.00. At Plaintiff's request both Defendants signed the renewal 
note and it is this instrument which Plaintiff has incorporated into its Com-
plaint and upon which it has pleaded for judgment, the Bank is attempting to 
hold Dr. Quinn liable for an ·amount in excess of his original guarantee as a 
result of loans which were made prior to the time that he was asked to sign 
the new note. It is hornbook law that a guarantor of an obligation of another 
must receive consideration if he is to become obligated for amounts of money 
in excess of his initial obligation. Where in this case the Plaintiff Bank gave 
no consideration to Dr. Quinn to induce him to become liable for an amount great-
er than the $180,000 guarantee, and where the amount for which he was asked to 
become liable had already been advanced to Alpine Rennsport and Jay H. Quinn, 
Jr., it is clear that there was no consideration for the additional guarantee 
of Dr. Quinn and he is entitled as a matter of law to a remittitur on the amount 
of $18,240 plus interest accrued on that amount from the date of the note until 
the date of judgment. The total of the amount to which Dr. Quinn is entitled 
as a remittitur thus being the sum of $21,543.80. 
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v 
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NGrWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A REMITTITUR AND FOR A NEW TRIAL? 
At the end of the Plaintiff's case, Defendants properly made a mot· 
ion to the Court to be awarded judgment on the pleadings holding that the B~k 
was not entitled to any deficiency judgment because of the failure of the B~k 
to give proper notice to the Defendants as required by the Code, and because 
the evidence in the case showed as a matter of law that the sale of the vehicle 
was not carried out in a commercially reasonable manner. The Court denied the 
Defendants' motions and the Defendant then put on his case. At the end of the 
Defendants' case, the motion for a directed verdict were again renewed and de-
nied by the Court. (Tr. 89-96, 234-35 .) The Court denied the Defendants' motions 
and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Bank for the full amount prayed 
for and answered the special Interrogatories that the Defendants had not been 
damaged by the Bank's failure to give notice as required by the statute. Defen· 
dants submitted a timely motion to the Court requesting a judgment notwithstand· 
ing the verdict and asking the Court to hold that as a matter of law the Bank 
was not entitled to a deficiency judgment; that the Defendant Dr. Quinn was en· 
titled to a remittitur in the amount of $21,543.80, and that the Defendants 
were entitled to a new trial because of the errors committed during the trial, 
particularly in failing to instruct the jury properly on the question of a com-
mercially reasonable sale and because of the Court's failure to rule as a matter 
of law that the Plaintiff was not entitled to a deficiency judgment. For the 
reasons set forth in Paragraphs I through IV above, it is the position of the · 
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Defendants that the Court erred in not granting to the Plaintiff judgment not-
withstanding the verdict to the effect that the Bank was not entitled to a de-
ficiency judgment or in the alternative, not granting a new trial on the issue 
of the dam.ages to the Defendant as a result of the failure of the Bank to prop-
erly give notice and to properly prove that the loan amount was not the reason-
able value of the collateral as required by the Clark Leasing Corp. case, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Appellants respectfully submit that since the Plaintiff 
Bank failed to notify the Defendants of the sale of collateral as required by 
Utah Code Ann. Section 70A-9-504(3), and because the sale of collateral was 
not carried out in a commercially reasonable manner causing damages to the De-
fendants because of the failure to sell the cars and boat properly, the judg-
ment entered in the Third District Court should be reversed, or in the alter-
native, Defendants should be granted a new trial or have their damages remitted 
to the sum of $45,000.00. 
Respectfully submitted this ./'.~ day of Febniary, 1980. 
"/ /' ~// 
_f-'',/// j ~//__ -~;~·; /«,/. / 
. '·/;·, .·I/, ,j,, / '--·--:f' , / ( /: - ·-<~/ :,/ -----~ ·' 
Edward/T. Wells 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
David K. Robinson 
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants 
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